Code: analysis, bugs, and security

supported by Bitdefender

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Course goals

improve skills: write robust, secure code
understand program internals
learn about security vulnerabilities, detection, prevention
use tools to reverse engineer and analyze code
perhaps in the future: analyze and counter malware

Code, data, stack, ...

```
We know the basics:
logically, the program has different memory areas:
code
(global) data
stack (for function calls)
heap (for dynamic allocation)
```

What can we find out about them by running a program ? (look at various addresses printed by progsegs.c)

Program addresses, at first sight

Addresses are in different numeric ranges

Recursive call: new copies for each instance can determine size of *stack frame*

Total address range (from code to stack) is HUGE orders of magnitude more than computer memory ⇒ these are *logical* (virtual), not physical addresses

Running the program repeatedly, addresses differ

Address Space Layout Randomization
estimate: how many bits vary ?
protects against attacks that need to know address values

Typical memory layout of C programs





Figure: http://www.geeksforgeeks.org/memory-layout-of-c-program/

Typical stack frame layout



Virtual memory in a nutshell

A mapping from logical to physical addresses supported by processor hardware (memory management unit) and operating system

provides abstraction (program need not worry about size and usage of physical memory)


virtual address space can be larger than physical memory memory *pages* transferred to/from secondary memory (disk) as needed

provides protection

 can set up permissions for memory segments
 memory space of one process protected from another
 but: can also set up sharing



Virtual Memory That is Larger Than Physical Memory



Address Translation






Figure 8.3 Address Translation in a Paging System

```
What difference (if any) is there between char s[] = "test"; and char *p = "test"; ?
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Array: char s[] = "test"; s[0] is 't', s[4] is '\0' etc. s is a constant address (char *), not a variable in memory CANNOT assign s = ... but may assign s[0] = 'f' sizeof(s) is 5 * sizeof(char)

&s is s, but different type, address of 5-char array: char (*)[5]

sizeof (entire array) is not strlen (up to '\0')
```

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sizeof(s) is 5 * sizeof(char)
&s is s, but different type, address of 5-char array: char (*)[5]
       sizeof (entire array) is not strlen (up to '\0')
Pointer: char *p = "test"; p[0] is 't', p[4] is '\0' (same)
p is a variable of address type (char *), has a memory location
CANNOT assign p[0] = f' ("test" is a string constant)
can do p = s; then p[0] = 'f'; can assign p = "ana";
\Rightarrow WRONG: scanf("%4s", &p); RIGHT: scanf("%4s", p);
                           (if p is valid address and has room)
```

The name of an array is a constant address

```
Can declare int a[LEN], *pa; and assign pa = a;

Similar: a and pa have same type: int *

But: pa is a variable ⇒ uses memory; can assign pa = addr

a is a constant (array has fixed address) can't assign a = addr

a a[0] a[1] a[2] a[3] a[4] a[5]

address
(hex)

b 500

int a[6];
int *pa = a;
```

*a and *pa: indirections with different operations in machine code:
 *a references object from constant address (direct addressing)
 *pa must first get value of variable pa (an address), loading it from the constant address &pa) then dereference it (indirect addressing)

Binary data representation

Suppose we want to process a bitmap file

Bitmap file header

This block of bytes is at the start of the file and is used to identify the file. A typical application reads this block first to ensure that the file is actually a BMP file and that it is not damaged. The first 2 bytes of the BMP file format are the character "B" then the character "M" in ASCII encoding. All of the integer values are stored in little-endian format (i.e. least-significant byte first).

Offset hex	Offset dec	Size	Purpose		
00	0	2 bytes	The header field used to identify the BMP and DIB file is 9x42 9x40 in hexadecimal, same as BM in ASCII. The following entries are possible: BM – Windows 3.1x, 95, NT, etc. BA – OSI/2 struct bitmap array CI – OSI/2 struct color icon CP – OSI/2 const color pointer IC – OSI/2 struct icon PT – OSI/2 pointer		
02	2	4 bytes	s The size of the BMP file in bytes		
06	6	2 bytes	Reserved; actual value depends on the application that creates the image		
08	8	2 bytes	Reserved; actual value depends on the application that creates the image		
0A	10	4 bytes	The offset, i.e. starting address, of the byte where the bitmap image data (pixel array) can be found.		

Bitmap file format (cont'd)

Offset (hex)	Offset (dec)	Size (bytes)	Windows BITMAPINFOHEADER ^[1]
0E	14	4	the size of this header (40 bytes)
12	18	4	the bitmap width in pixels (signed integer)
16	22	4	the bitmap height in pixels (signed integer)
1A	26	2	the number of color planes (must be 1)
1C	28	2	the number of bits per pixel, which is the color depth of the image. Typical values are 1, 4, 8, 16, 24 and 32.
1E	30	4	the compression method being used. See the next table for a list of possible values
22	34	4	the image size. This is the size of the raw bitmap data; a dummy 0 can be given for BI_RGB bitmaps.
26	38	4	the horizontal resolution of the image. (pixel per meter, signed integer)
2A	42	4	the vertical resolution of the image. (pixel per meter, signed integer)
2E	46	4	the number of colors in the color palette, or 0 to default to 2 ⁿ
32	50	4	the number of important colors used, or 0 when every color is important; generally ignored

To work with ints that are exactly 2 bytes, 4 bytes, etc., need fixed-width integers: stdint.h (since C99) int8_t, int16_t, int32_t, int64_t, uint8_t, uint16_t, uint32_t, uint64_t

Big-endian and little-endian

BMP specification: "all integers are stored in little-endian format"

little-endian: least-significant byte first 0x12345678 is stored as 0x78 0x56 0x34 0x12 Intel x86

big-endian: most-significant byte first
0x12345678 is stored as 0x12 0x34 0x56 0x78
Mac, PPC, Sun, Internet (also called 'network byte order')

Make sure values are read/written from/to file in correct byte order

We'll use: Program analysis infrastructures

Allow program representation and manipulation at source or binary level

Built-in analyses + API to write your own

LLVM: one of the most widely used, complete compiler toolchain

BAP (D. Brumley, CMU): OCaml + Python bindings team won DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge 2016

angr (UC Santa Barbara): Python framework

CIL (G. Necula, Berkeley): OCaml + Perl outputs instrumented C code

Example of source instrumentation with CIL

Analysis library provides a data type to represent statements

```
type stmtkind =
 | Instr of instr list (* straight-line instructions *)
  Return of exp option * location (* The return statement. *)
  | Goto of stmt ref * location (* A goto statement. *)
  Break of location (* break to end of nearest loop/switch *)
  | Continue of location (* continue to start of nearest loop *)
  | If of exp * block * block * location (* A conditional. *)
  | Switch of exp * block * (stmt list) * location
  | Loop of block * location * (stmt option) * (stmt option)
 (* a while(1) loop with continue and break *)
  | Block of block (* block of statements. *)
```

C representation in CIL (cont'd.)

To instrument code, traverse statements (control flow graph), identify interesting statements, insert new ones.

e.g. can log all/some memory writes

Fast compiler-supported instrumentation

Address sanitizer (with recent clang / gcc versions)

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(void) {
 char *p = malloc(20);
 strcpy(p, "test");
 puts(p);
 free(p);
 p[1] = 'a'; // wrong
% gcc -fsanitize=address usefree.c
% ./a.out
==31741==ERROR: AddressSanitizer:
                                   heap-use-after-free on
address 0x60300000efe1 at pc 0x0000004008c6 bp
0x7ffeef2227b0 sp 0x7ffeef2227a8
WRITE of size 1 at 0x60300000efe1 thread TO
#0 0x4008c5 in main /home/marius/curs/bitdef/usefree.c:11
```

Software security: increasingly automated

automated vulnerability detection + exploit generation comparison of old (buggy) + patched program versions \Rightarrow exploit generation

'compilers' for return-oriented programming exploits

A good read (insights into research advances):

G. Vigna et al., (State of) The Art of War: Offensive Techniques in Binary Analysis, IEEE Security & Privacy, 2016